This paper summarizes a number of studies which use patent data to examine different aspects of technological change. It describes our finn level data set construction effort; reports on the relationship between R&D expenditures and the level of patenting; analyzes the relationship between patents, R&D, and the stock market value of firms; reports on the estimation of the value of patent rights based on European patent renewal data; and describes the use of patent data to estimate the importance of R&D spillovers.
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Introduction
In this paper we present an overview of a series of studies pursued at the NBER during the last decade which used patent statistics to study different aspects of the economics of technological change. It consists of five substantive sections: A description of our firm level data; a report on the relationship between R&D expenditures and the level of patenting; a report on the relationship between patents, the stock market value of firms, and their R&D expenditures; a summary of work on the estimation of the value of patent rights based on patent renewal data; and a description of the use of patent data to estimate the importance of R&D spillovers. A brief set of conclusions closes the paper.
The NBER-R&D Data Base and the Growth of U.S. Firms in the 1970s
A major achievement of the NBER project has been the development and construction of a large data set covering the economic and technological performance of most of publicly traded U.S. manufacturing companies from the early 1960s through the early 1980s. It is the result of a detailed match of publicly available sales, employment, investment, R&D, and balance sheet information from the Compustat tapes (based on company 10-K filings with the SEC) with data acquired from the U.S. Patent Office on patents issued to all organizations between 1969 and 1982. Three major tasks had to be accomplished to make these data useable: (1) The Patent Office data on the number of patents granted to various organizations had to be matched with our list of manufacturing corporations. (2) The balance sheet items in the Compustat record had to be converted from historical to either current replacement or constant dollar prices. And (3) detailed sales price indexes had to be imported into these files to allow the computation of output and productivity measures for these companies.
To assemble our data set we started with the population of firms Cummins et al, 1985 and sound, et al, 1984 for a description of this sample and the Appendix for more detail on on the match procedures). We then matched to this firm data set the detailed information on patents granted from the Office of Technology Assessment and Forecast (OTAF) tapes and found that approximately two-thirds of these firms received at least one patent between 1969 and 1982. A preliminary analysis of aggregate trends in these data revealed changing lags due to fluctuations in the delays at the Patent Office in processing the applications. Because patents are recorded by date granted while we are interested, primarily, in patent counts by date of application, such delays have implications for the completeness of our series in the later years. Table 1 provides a distribution of U.S. patents by date granted and by date applied for and shows both the degree of completeness of the data at any point of time and the fluctuations in the lag between the application 2 Table 1 The Distribution of Patents Applied for by Year of Application, 1970-1982, and  any point of time and the fluctuations in the lag between the application and granting dates. About 97 percent of all patent applications which will be ultimately granted are granted within the first four years of the application date (but only about 70 to 80 percent are granted within the first three years). Hence, our sample of patents by date of application extends effectively only through 1979.
In Bound et al (1984) we looked primarily at the cross-sectional aspect of these data. We found that about two-thirds of our sample were granted at least one patent between 1965 and 1979 and that the smaller firms (less than ten million dollars in sales) account for a slightly larger fraction of patents than of R&D or sales. The industries with a higher than average ratio of patents to R&D were the chemical, drug, petroleum, engine, farm and construction machinery, electrical equipment, and aircraft industries. Although technology based, firms in the communications equipment and computer industries patent less than the average of firms doing the same amount of R&D. (See Table 2 .)
Turning to the scale question, we found very little evidence that larger firms or firms doing more R&D were more productive in patenting (Figure 1 ). The answer to this question is clouded by conflicting results from alternative specifications of the relationship of patenting to R&D and by the sheer diversity of the firms in our sample. For the larger firms in our sample patenting is approximately proportional to R&D. The smallest fins do seem to show somewhat more patenting per R&D dollar but they are a far more selected group, owing to the way we chose the sample. (A small firm has to be in some sense more than usually successful to be listed on one of the stock exchanges.) To look at time series aspects of our data, we have focused on a subsample of manufacturing firms (excluding foreign-owned firms and whollyowned subsidiaries) which (1) See Griliches-Mairesse (1983 for sources and met hodolog. Food, etc. Another interesting aspect of Table 3 is its indication that the overall industry growth rates (of both employment and productivity) are lower than the average rates experienced by the firms in our sample. In part this reflects the selectivity of our sample. To be present in 1976 a firm, other things equal, must have been growing faster before 1976. To survive to 1980 also required above average growth. These issues of selective mortality have been investigated by Addanki (1986) and Hall (1985) . Addanki shows that firms that exited between 1976 and 1984 were small on average and less R&D intensive, though with slightly more patents per R&D dollar. The major difference between the numbers at the aggregate and the firm levels arises from differences in weighting. Because the firm level averages are unweighted, they are dominated by the small firms which survived throughout the whole period. They did indeed grow faster (see Hall, 1985) . The average firm in the sample was, therefore, during this period growing faster than the corres-ponding industry total.
The data sets we have constructed contain a large number of interesting variables only some of which have been explored in our own work. The major available variables are: Cross and net value of plant in historical, constant, and current prices, total sales in current and constant prices, operating income, dividends, market value of the firm, number of employees, investment and R&D expenditures in current and constant prices, inventories, advertising and pension expense, number of patents received by date of grant and date of application, stock market rate of return (calendar and fiscal year), and the various relevant price indexes used in the construction of the "constant price" series. These data are a major research asset which is also available for use by others.
Patents and R&D
Much of our work was devoted to using the assembled patent data to study the R&D process and its contribution to economic growth. This is one (Table 4) . Not only do firms that spend more on R&D receive more patents, but also when a firm changes its R&D expenditures, parallel changes occur in its level of patenting. The bulk of the relationship in the within-f iS dimension between R&D and patent applications appears to be close to contemporaneous. The lag effects are significant but relatively small and not well estimated (Table 5 ). The significant coefficient for R&D five years back indicates, however, the probability of a long unseen "tail" to the effect of past R&D on the level of patenting. Pakes and Griliches interpret their estimates as implying that patents are a fairly good indicator of differences in inventive activity across firms, but that short-term fluctuations in their numbers within firms have a large noise component in them. They also find that, 7 From: Pakes and Griljches (1980) except for drug firms, there has been a consistent, negative trend in the number of patents applied for and granted relative to R&D expenditures during their period of observation, 1968-1975. In analyzing the relationship between patents and R&D we encountered a number of serious substantive and econometric problems. The first and, at least in retrospect, most important problem is that the size or value of the "output" associated with a particular patent varies enormously over different patents. We shall come back to this problem below and present some estimates of its magnitude and its consequences for our work. The second is that patents do not represent all of the output of R&D. Only a fraction of it is patentable or patented. Moreover, this fraction may vary considerably over industry, firm, and time. We tried to control for such differences in the firms' propensity to patent by using covariance (fixedeffects) techniques, estimating conditionally on the overall patenting performance of the firm, or treating them as unobservables in a multiequation context. We also included year effects as a partial solution to the problem of the changing effectiveness of patents as a tool of appropriability over time.
Two other problems required the development of new econometric tools:
(1) Our Large panel is rather short becausepublic reporting of R&D expenditures became prevalent only after 1972. Thus we have only about six to eight years worth of data and this may be too short a time period to elicit a good estimate of the R&D to patents lag structure. And (2), the dependent variable, patent counts, is an integer with many zeroes and is subject to significant heteroskedasticity due to the wide size range of our firms. In Pakes and Criliches (l984b) we suggest a specific procedure for dealing with the first problem: truncation bias in the estimation of distributed lag models in short panels. It is based on an explicit modelling of the unseen pre-1972 R&D history. The integer dependent variable problem was attacked in Hausman, Hall, and Criliches (1984) by extending, developing, and estimating a Poisson-type stochastic specification for our data.
(This methodology was also applied in Bound et al, 1984 .) The heteroskedasticity and integer problem was also approached via consistent non-linear estimation with robust standard errors.
Our most recent paper on the relationship between patents and R&D (Hall, Criliches, Hausman, 1986) This too may, however reflect the high noise ratio in our patent data 9 rather than the true absence of such a relationship. (4) An interesting finding that emerged from this study, and also Pakes' (1985) earlier work, has nothing to say about patenting, although it provides one reason why it is difficult to measure this relationship within firms over time: The pattern of R&D investment within a firm is essentially a random walk (or more precisely, a martingale) with a relatively low error variance (Table   6 ). In other words, R&D budgets over this short horizon ( This does not mean that there is no interesting information in these data, only that one should not take small annual variations in small numbers too seriously, a point to which we shall return below.
Patents, R&D, and Stock Market Values
The second set of studies involving patents and related variables are connected by their use of stock market values or the stock market rate of return as indicators of the success of inventive activity and as the driving force behind the investments in it. The use of stock market values as an output indicator has one major advantage. because the public-good characteristics of inventive output make it extremely difficult to market, returns to innovation are earned mostly by embodying it in a tangible good 10 2. All equations contain a separate intercept for each year.
3. These are tests of the stationarity assumption. We have eight estimates of the variance, seven for the first order covariance, six for the second, and so forth. We have added 1/3 to the patents variable before taking the logarithm due to the presence of some zeroes.
From: Hall et al (1986 Table 7 ). Moreover, the parameter values indicate that these changes in patents and R&D are associated with large movements in stock market values. On average, an "unexpected" increase in one patent is associated with an increase in the firm's market value of $810,000, while an unexpected increase of $100 of R&D expenditures is, again, on average, associated with a $1,870 increase in the value of the firm. The R&D expenditure series appear to be almost error free in this context. Patents, however, contain a significant noise component (a component whose variance is not related to either the R&D or the stock market rate of return series). This noise component accounts for only a small fraction of the large differences in the number of patent applications of different firms (about 25%), but plays a much larger role among the smaller fluctuations that occur in the patent applications of a given firm over time (about 95%). Similarily, the effect of unexpected increases in patents on market value is highly variable. Nevertheless, there is still some information in the time-series dimension. If we were to observe, for example, a sudden large burst in the patent applications of a given firm, we could be quite sure that events have occurred to cause a large change in the market value of its R&D program; but smaller changes in the patent applications of a given firm are not likely to be very informative. This statement must be modified somewhat when we consider long-term differences in the patents of a given firm (say differences over aS-or 10-year interval), since a larger fraction of their variance is Pakes (1985) caused by events that lead the market to reevaluate the firm's inventive output during these periods.
The timing of the response of patents and R&D to events which change the value of a firm's R&D effort is quite similar. One gets the impression from the estimates that such events cause a chain reaction, inducing an increase in R&D expenditures far into the future, and that fins patent around the links of this chain almost as quickly as they are completed, resulting in a rather close relationship between R&D expenditures and the number of patents applied for. Perhaps surprisingly, he finds no evidence that independent changes in the number of patents applied for (independent of current and earlier R&D expenditures) produce significant effects on the market's valuation of the firm (this is reflected by a lack of an independent effect of lagged p r in the R&D equation and of q on p in the patent equation in Table 7 ). The data cannot differentiate between different kinds of events that change a firm's R&D level.
In a related paper Mairesse and Siu (1984) In principle, one would like to use modern time series techniques together with some of the testable implications of recent investment theory to separate out the timing in the relationships between these variables and to consider disturbances processes that intercede between them. One of the conclusions of the Pakes paper, however, was that to separate out successfully the effects of different kinds of events on inventive activity will require a larger model and more indicator variables than were used heretofore. Especially distressing was his inability to distinguish between demand shocks, where demand shocks are loosely defined as events which cause increases in patenting only through the R&D expenditures they induce, and technological or supply shocks which may have a direct effect on patents as well as an indirect effect via induced R&D demand. A model capable of distinguishing between these shocks requires the addition of variables which react differently to such events.
A prototype of such a model is outlined in Griliches, Hall and Pakes (1986) , where the results of a replication of some of Pakes (1985) computations for a larger sample and an expan-sion of his equation system to add equations for sales, employment, and investment are also reported. They indicate that the addition of the latter variables is helpful, in the sense that fluctuations 15 in their growth rates are related to fluctuations in both the growth rate of R&D and the stock market rate of return and hence should help in identifying the relationships we are interested in. On the other hand, the expansion of the sample to include many small finns with low levels of patenting, deteriorates significantly the informational content of this variable, raising its noise to signal ratio, and making it hard to discern a feedback from the independent variability in patenting to any of the other variables. Thus, at the moment, it does not look as if the data can sustain a model with two separate factors ("market" and "technological" innovations), even though in principle such a model should be identifiable in this kind of data and with this number of variables.
The difficulties in implementing such models arise to a large extent from the large "noise" component in patents as indicators of R&D output in the short-rim within-firm dimension. While we were aware of the problem from the beginning, it was the work of Pakes and Schankerman (1984) , which we turn to next, and their estimates of the dispersion of patent values which alerted us to its actual magnitude. Using their numbers Griliches, Hall, and Pakes (1986) estimate that though unexpected changes in the present value of R&D output can account only for about one percent of the variation in the stock market value of a firm from year to year and that the proportion that is accountable by unexpected changes in the number of patents is even smaller (less than 0.1 percent). Thus, it is not surprising that it is difficult to use patent data to separate out demand from supply shocks and follow these effects over time.
Patent Renewal Data 16
In many countries and recently also in the U.S., holders of patents must pay an annual renewal fee in order to keep their patents in force. If the renewal fee is not paid in any single year the patent is permanently cancelled. Assuming that renewal decisions are based on economic criteria, agents will only renew their patents if the value of holding them over an additional year exceeds the cost of such renewal. Observations on the proportion of patents that are renewed at alternative ages, together with the relevant renewal fee schedules, will then contain information on the distribution of the holding values of patents, and on the evolution of this distribution function over the lifespan of the patents. Since patent rights are seldom marketed, this is one of the few sources of information on their value. In a series of papers Fakes and Schanlcennan (1984), Fakes (1986) , and Schankerman and Fakes (1986) present and estimate models which allow them to recover the distribution of returns from holding patents at each age over their lifespan. Since the renewal decision is based on the value of patent protection to the patentee, the procedure used in these articles directly estimates the private value of the benefits derived from the patent laws. Estimates of the distribution of these benefits at an economy-wide level of aggregation, and of movements in them over the post-1950 period are also obtained.
In addition, these patent renewal models imply that ideas for which patent protection is more valuable will tend to be protected by payment of renewal fees for longer periods of time. This suggests using the patent renewal data to construct an index of the average value, or quality, of the ideas embodied in patents, and then using this index to supplement the quantity-based patent count data in constructing more comprehensive and 17 accurate measures of the value of patented output. There are two reasons why an index of the value of patented ideas should prove useful. First, the average value of patented inventions may differ among groups of patentees or over time periods, so that differences in the number of patents among groups or time periods will provide systematically biased estimates of differences in their value. Second, both small sample case studies and larger sample econometric evidence indicate that the distribution of the value of patented ideas is very dispersed and highly skewed (see below for details). This implies that the "noise to signal" ratio in the patent count variable as a measure of the value of patented ideas is large. Provided that differently valued patents are renewed for different lengths of time, the renewal data allow us to construct an indicator of the value of patented output with a lower noise to signal ratio than that of the patent count index alone. We illustrate these two uses of the renewal data below.
In Pakes (1986) patent holders are allowed to be uncertain about the sequence of returns that will accrue to the patent if it is to be kept in force. This uncertainty is introducted to allow for the fact that agents often apply for patents at an early stage in the innovation process, a stage in which the agent is still exploring alternative opportunities for earning returns from the information embodied in the patented idea. Early patenting arises in part from the incentive structure created by the patent system, since, if the agent does not patent the information available to him, somebody else might. This incentive is reinforced by the fact that the renewal fees in all countries studied are quite small during the early years of a patent's life.
A patent holder who pays the renewal fee obtains both the current returns that accrue to the patent over the coming period, and the option to pay the renewal fee and maintain the patent in force in the following period should he desire to do so. An agent who acts optimally will pay the renewal fee only if the sum of the current returns plus the value of this option exceeds the renewal fee. It is assumed that the agent values the option at the expected discounted value of future net returns (current returns minus renewal fees), taking account of the fact that an optimal policy will be followed in each future period, and conditional on the information currently at the disposal of the agent. An optimal sequential policy for the agent has the form of an optimal renewal (or stopping) rule; a rule determining whether to pay the renewal fee at each age. The proportion of patents which drop out at age a corresponds to the proportion of patents which do not satisfy the renewal criteria at that age The empirical results from the Pakes (1986) paper indicate that patents are applied for at an early stage in the inventive process, a stage in which there is still substantial uncertainty concerning both the returns that will be earned from holding the patents, and the returns that will accrue to the patented ideas. Gradually the patentors uncover more information about the actual value of their patents. Most turn out to be Even though the total number of patent applications fell during the 1970s, one should not take this decline in numbers as implying, necessarily, the exhaustion of technological opportunities. Schankerman and Pakes find that although the numbers of patents per scientist and engineer fell sharply, their estimated "quality-adjusted" total value of patent rights per scientist and engineer was remarkably stable over the period examined by them (Table 8) .
One final point. Disaggregated patent renewal data are gathered by the International Patent Documentation
Center (INPADOC). These data would allow one to investigate the returns to patent protection separately by technical field of the patent and by the nationality and type of patentor (e.g., individuals and small business enterprises vs large corporate entities). Issues related to which sectors of a particular economy, and which economies, derive disproportionate benefits from the patent laws lie at the heart of most discussions of cost and benefits of alternative patent systems (see Scherer, 1965, Chapter 16, and the literature cited there.) Moreover, inter-sectoral differences in the patenting and R&D processes are central to the literature on market structure, industrial policy, and technical progress. Thus, future studies using these data could be very interesting and should be encouraged.
The Spillover Effects of R&D
One of the major unresolved issues in this area of research is the identification and measurement of R&D spillovers, the benefits that one company or industry receives from the R&D activity of another. It is difficult to trace such spillovers without having strong a priori notions From: Schankerman and Pakes (1936) N.)
I-.
about who are the potential beneficiaries of whose research. One of the ways we have been trying to approach this problem is by using the detailed information on patenting by type of patent (patent class) to cluster firms into common "technological activity" clusters and looking whether a firm's variables are related to the overall activity levels of its cluster.
In his thesis and several recent papers, Adam Jaffe (1983 Jaffe ( , 1984 Jaffe ( , 1985 Jaffe ( , 1986 has used firm level data on patenting by class of patent and on Not surprisingly, perhaps, firms in technological clusters with large overall R&D "pools" invested more intensively in R&D than would be predicted just from their industrial (SIC) location. More interesting is the finding that firms received more patents per R&D dollar in clusters where more R&D was performed by others, again above and beyond any pure industry differences (based on a classification of their sales). (See Table   9 .) Similarly, his analysis of firm productivity growth during the 1972-1977 period showed that it was related positively to both the average R&D 22 From: Jaffe (1985) intensity of the individual firms and the change in the size of the R&D pool available to these firms (Table 10 ). The magnitude and significance of these effects is robust, allowing also for industry based differences in average rates of productivity growth. In terms of profits, or market value, however, there are both positive and negative effects of neighboring firms' R&D. The net effect is positive for high R&D firms, but firms with R&D about one standard deviation below the mean are made worse off overall by the R&D of others. More generally, the idea of R&D spillovers is made operational by using the information in the patenting patterns of firms to construct a measure of their position in "technological space" and of the closeness between them and it is shown that this position has an observable impact on the fin's success. 
Summary
In this paper we describe a number of studies whose common denominator is the use of patent statistics to illuminate the process of innovation and technical change. One of the main findings of this project was the discovery of a strong relationship in the cross-sectional dimension.
Patents are a good indicator of differences in inventive activity across different firms. While the propensity to patent differs significantly across industries, the relationship between R&D and patents is close to proportional, especially for firms above a minimal size. Small firms do receive a significantly higher number of patents per R&D dollar but this can be explained largely by their being a much more highly selected group.
(To be in our sample a small firm must be successful enough to have publicly traded securities.) There is also a statistically significant relationship between R&D and patents in the within-firm time-series (Differences, 1977 (Differences, -1972 there are some lagged effects, but they seem to be small and difficult to estimate precisely. These findings can also be interpreted as implying some reverse causality: successful research leads both to patents and to a counnitment of additional funds for the development of resulting ideas.
Using data on patent renewal rates and patent renewal fees in selected European countries we have estimated the private value of patent rights, their dispersion, and their decay over time. The average value of patent rights is quite small, about $7,000 and $17,000 per patent in France and Germany respectively. It is also very variable and its distribution is quite skewed. While most patent rights were close to worthless, one percent of them had values in excess of $70,000 and $120,000 per patent in
France and Germany respectively. These returns were estimated, however, to decline rather rapidly over time, with rates of obsolesence between 10 and 20 percent per year. While the aggregate value of patent rights appears to be quite high, it is estimated to be only on the order of 10 to 15 percent of total national expenditures on R&D. Hence it is unlikely to be the major factor in determining the overall level of such expenditures. Using these newly developed methods of analysis we show that even though the total number of patent applications fell during the 1970s, their estimated "quality" rose, implying that one cannot take the observed decline in numbers as indicating, necessarily, the exhaustion of technological opportunities. The finding of extreme skewness in the distribution of the value of patent rights has, however, pessimistic implications for the use of patent counts as indicators of short run changes in the output of R&D. Footnotes *We are indebted to our collaborators for many contributions to the work discussed here and to the National Science Foundation (50C78-04279, PRA79-13740, PRA81-08635, and PRA8S-l2758) and the NEER for financial support.
our sample or otherwise disposed of. The remaining largest unmatched organizations turned out to be agencies of the U.S. Government, several privately-held companies, and a few service companies which obtained patents for inventors.
